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Information and Financial Crisis Policymaking
Christopher Gandrud and Mı´chea´l O’Kee↵e⇤
Abstract
The degree to which governments intervene to contain financial crises varies considerably. We aim
to understand why policymakers choose the level of intervention they do to contain financial shocks.
In particular, we want to understand why policymakers may choose policies that create outcomes
they do not want. We focus on a defining feature of financial crisis policymaking that has been largely
unaddressed in the literature on policy responses to crises: policymakers lack good information about
the health of their banking systems. So, they rely on their bureaucrats and other actors for necessary
information. However, information providers may have di↵erent policy preferences. To understand
the interactions between these actors and the implications for policy choice, we advance a signalling
game of financial crisis containment. We use comparative statics and a case study of the recent Irish
crisis to demonstrate how information asymmetries can have a significant impact on bailout choices.
Keywords: banking crisis, financial crisis policymaking, guarantees, Ireland, signalling games
1 Introduction
Governments in countries confronted with financial shocks face a severe trade-o↵. To contain a crisis they
must announce a policy response that will restore confidence to the financial system. At the same time,
such measures expose governments to significant possible fiscal costs which may threaten the solvency of
the state itself. This was dramatically demonstrated by the Irish Government’s 2008 decision to provide
a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities.
Despite the size of the Irish response, which included guarantees that amounted to e365 billion, or
almost 2.5 times GNP (Honohan, 2010, 19), decision-makers believed that it would end up costing very
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little as the guarantees were not likely to be redeemed. The financial sector was believed by many to
be merely su↵ering a short-term liquidity crisis rather than a fundamental problem of insolvency. This
sentiment was expressed by the Minister for Finance who shortly after the first round of banking system
support was announced commented that it was “the cheapest bailout in the world so far”.1 But by
Spring 2011 the bill had reached e70 billion, leading the central bank Governor to note that it had
ended up being one of the costliest crises in history.2 Irish policymakers seemed to have chosen exactly
the containment level that they did not want. The recent Irish example motivates us to create a general
way of conceptualising banking crisis policymaking so that we can understand counter-intuitive situations
where decision-makers end up choosing crisis containment policies that lead to non-preferred outcomes.
Our article makes an important contribution to the growing literature on the political economy of
public responses to banking crises (see Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Grossman and Woll, 2014; Keefer,
2007; Pepinsky, 2014; Rodrik, 1999; Rosas, 2006, 2009; Weber and Schmitz, 2011; Woll, 2014). We use
a signalling game framework to understand how information asymmetries between political decision-
makers and bureaucrats shape initial crisis responses. Specifically, we adapt seminal models of strategic
information transmission (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987) by making domain
specific assumptions about what information policymakers need, as well as what the ranges of their and
their bureaucrats’ preferences are.
Information poor decision-makers rely on financial bureaucrats for information about the proportion
of non-performing loans (NPL) in their banking systems and the recovery value of these loans in the
aftermath of shocks. These are important indicators of how much a given policy response is likely to cost.
If information providers have di↵erent preferences from decision-makers, they are likely to give vague
or even uninformative messages. This prevents decision-makers from choosing crisis responses that they
prefer. The model also predicts situations where decision-makers receive accurate information: when
decision-makers and information providers have closely aligned bailout preferences.
Information asymmetries have long been acknowledged as a cause of crises (e.g. Mishkin, 1990), and
have been well-studied in the broader game theory literature (for a review see Sobel, 2013). However,
research on policy responses to financial crises has not systematically explored information problems,
instead implicitly assuming that decision-makers have perfect information about their banking systems.
Rather than studying information asymmetries, previous work has focused on factors including di↵erences
between democracies and non-democracies, institutional weaknesses in emerging economies, and the
number of veto players to explain policy choices.
These works have been shown to have poor explanatory power in light of the 2008 financial crisis
1Brian Lenihan to the Leinster Society of Chartered Accountants lunch in Dublin, October 23rd, 2008.
2Patrick Honohan, March 31st, 2011.
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(Gandrud and Hallerberg, 2015b). The present state of the art has little to say about cases like Ireland’s,
as it is an advanced democracy with a developed economy, and (at least before the crisis) well regarded
public and private financial institutions. Previous work suggests that the Irish crisis response should
have been low cost, but it clearly was not. We show that bringing information asymmetries into the
crisis policy response literature generates better explanations.
It is important to emphasise the external validity and generalisability of the environment we are
modelling. Previous work has largely assumed that decision-makers in wealthier, and especially demo-
cratic countries are not as reliant on domestic public bureaucracies and banks themselves for information
about banks’ health as policymakers are in less wealthy and less democratic countries (e.g. Satyanath,
2006). It is assumed that bureaucratic actors in more advanced markets are more transparent and non-
bureaucratic actors, including a free financial press and robust auditors, serve as independent sources of
information. However, these may not be reasonable assumptions.
Financial bureaucracies, even in advanced economies can be relatively opaque. Gandrud and Haller-
berg (2015a) document that only about a third of EU member states regularly release marginally detailed
supervisory data on banks. In the data that is released it is di cult or impossible to get a real-time and
accurate impression of the full extent of non-performing loans. This limits the independent information
that the press and decision-makers can access. In some countries, such as Germany, confidentiality laws
even prohibited law-makers from accessing bank-level supervisory information. Only after the 2007-09
crisis have German lawmakers gained some access to this information, though still within the confines
of a special investigation.
There are many examples of information problems between bureaucracies from the recent crisis. For
example, in September 2007 deliberations at the Bank of England about how and how much to support
troubled lender Northern Rock it is clear that the now defunct Financial Services Authority (FSA)
presented an overly rosy picture of the lender’s health. The “FSA were clear that Northern Rock’s
problems were liquidity related there was not a solvency issue” (Bank of England, 2007, 53). It would
turn out that the FSA was in fact providing unjustifiably positive information. After being provided
with extensive public liquidity support, Northern Rock was nationalised in 2008.
Though, in general non-governmental actors are important sources of information, their ability to
provide accurate information about quantities such as NPLs during the start of a crisis has been limited.
Sikka (2009) shows that banks across Europe and the United States received clean bills of health from
external auditors, often within a few months of their collapse in the 2007-09 crisis.
International or supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the European
Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB) may release their own information to governments
and closely scrutinise domestic bureaucracies’ information. However, they generally play a major role
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after a crisis has started.3 Often they are brought in because a government’s initial crisis response–what
we are primarily trying to explain–ended up being unsustainable.
2 Previous Explanations of Banking Crisis Containment
When a country has widespread bank insolvencies it is in a banking crisis (Sundararajan and Balin˜o,
1991). “Because bank balance sheets are tightly integrated and bank capital is highly leveraged, the
failure of a single insolvent bank may threaten to upset the entire banking system and have e↵ects
on the real economy” (Rosas, 2009, 6). If bank failures have potentially large and widespread negative
externalities it is reasonable to assume that most actors–policymakers, bankers, the public–greatly prefer
mitigating the impact of these crises with government intervention to inaction. Before developing our
signalling game for how decision-makers choose crisis containment policies we critically discuss the state
of the art literature attempting to explain how governments intervene.
Crony capitalism is possibly the most straightforward political economy approach to understanding
why countries choose high levels of bank support to contain crises. Bankers prefer public to private losses
as public losses in banking crises are wealth transfers to them. So, they push for high public guarantees
to forestall insolvency, i.e. they gamble for resurrection (Downs and Rocke, 1994). Politicians with
cronyistic ties to bankers are more likely to use bailouts at the expense of di↵use public interests such
as taxpayers (Rosas, 2006). The crony capitalism theory expects decision-makers with close ties to the
banking sector to pursue policies that maintain the solvency of banks even at substantial public expense.
Another major stream in the literature focuses on veto players. Opinion about how the number and
polarisation of a country’s veto players a↵ects policy choices during banking crisis ranges considerably.
On the one hand, Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that as the number of veto players increases, we
are less likely to expect them all to agree on a new policy. Therefore crisis responses in general will be
slow and inadequate. Conversely, Rodrik (1999) suggests that having many veto players, if organised to
manage conflicts, will result in more appropriate and quickly implemented crisis management policies.
Keefer (2007) argues that the number of veto players has no e↵ect on crisis responses, but competitive
elections encourage better crisis responses for the general public since they weaken policymakers’ ties
to banking interests and align them more closely with taxpayers. Similarly, Rosas (2009) argues that
actors in democratic rather than authoritarian countries are more likely to use public cost reducing
crisis responses, since electoral incentives push them to favour limiting public losses. Countries with
competitive elections, regardless of the number of veto players, could be more likely to choose crisis
response policies that limit public costs. However, working with updated data, Gandrud and Hallerberg
3An exception is the post-crisis ECB, which has direct supervisory responsibilities.
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(2015b) find no di↵erence in costs between countries with less and more competitive elections.
Choices may also be constrained or shaped by bureaucratic capacity (for a discussion of this type
of argument see Satyanath, 2006, 18). Bureaucratic institutions do not have equal capacity across all
countries. Higher capacity regulators, ministries of finance, and central bank o cials with expertise
are better able to implement complex policies, such as orchestrating sustainable bank mergers. For the
same reasons, bureaucrats with lower capacities might be restricted in the policies they can plausibly
enact and therefore have incentives to try (see Huber and McCarty, 2004). Policymakers may take this
into account when choosing policy responses. Furthermore, high capacity bureaucracies may be able
to obtain better quality information about the true health of the banking sector (Abonyi, 2005). How
might bureaucratic capacity help us predict containment policy choices? One expectation would be that
if a bureaucracy could be held accountable and could more accurately monitor banking activity then the
country would accurately target support at solvent, though illiquid institutions, and so would be less
likely to issue costly crisis containment support.
Through conditions on loans that countries in financial crises desperately need, international institu-
tions may force countries to adopt certain policies (Vreeland, 2003). Receiving support from international
institutions could result in policies closer to the preferences of these institutions.
Throughout previous work, when information asymmetries are discussed, they are generally believed
to exist in less developed countries. Satyanath (2006), for example, examined how information asym-
metries could a↵ect developing countries’ pre-crisis financial regulatory choices. However, he explicitly
assumed that information asymmetries were not an important component of decision-making in more
advance financial centres. Woll (2014) argues that governments with one-to-one relationships with
banks have costlier responses than those that interact with banking sectors capable of making collective
commitments and thus private sector contributions to bailouts. She does briefly mention information
asymmetries as an important factor in this process for the Irish bailout. However, she includes them
in an ad hoc manner.
3 Signalling Game Setup
We aim to directly understand how information asymmetries and di↵erences in preferences among gov-
ernment actors a↵ect what containment policy level is initially chosen. To do this we build on seminal
analysis by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) to advance a signalling game
where the actor who makes the containment policy decision relies on information from information rich
actors, primarily their financial bureaucrats. These actors have preferences about policy decisions and
aim to influence them.
5
The general model and its generic conclusions are well-established in the game theory literature
(Sobel, 2013). Our innovation is the creation and application of useful domain specific assumptions
about what decisions policymakers are concerned with and what information they need to make these
decisions. In so doing, we clarify this complex policy environment and derive a useful theoretical model
allowing us to make novel predictions that were not previously possible in the banking crisis policymaking
literature.
The Players We model banking crisis policymaking as the result of a game between two sets of actors.
One set makes the containment policy decision. This could be, for example, a prime minister or president.
We call her the decision-maker (DM). Before making her decision she needs to receive information sent
by one or more signallers who are information rich. For convenience, we denote the information providers
as the financial regulator (FR) and the minister of finance (MoF).
Field of Play: The Banking System Balance Sheet The environment within which our actors
manoeuvre is a banking system. To demonstrate why a decision-maker must rely on signals from financial
bureaucrats for a containment policy decision, we first model how a shock would generate changes to the
proportion of NPLs. For both modelling simplicity and because we assume that the decision-maker is
concerned with the e↵ect of policy choices on the entire banking system, rather than individual banks,
we focus on the balance sheet of an entire banking system. We characterise the balance sheet of the
banking system in terms of assets (A), liabilities (L), and capital (C).
The asset side consists of a portfolio of assets. These can be loans to households or firms, for
example. Assets have two broad types: performing (P ) and non-performing (N). The value of assets
that are performing is denoted AP . This is simply the book value of the assets. While we use AN
for the value of the same assets when they are non-performing. Firms or mortgage holders may fall
behind on their payments or default on their loans with probability   and create non-performing assets.
Non-performing assets always have a real value less than their book value.4
Banks play a fundamental role in the transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans.
However, this creates an asset-liability maturity mismatch. Banks rely on both traditional retail deposits
and wholesale funding on the liabilities side to finance their assets. Deposits may be withdrawn and
wholesale funding may not be rolled over. The banking system’s balance sheet makes it vulnerable to
liquidity risk. On the liability side of the balance sheet we have regulatory capital. This will often
take the form of hybrid claims such as subordinated debt or preferred equity instruments which are
considered as a bu↵er against losses that protects depositors. Building on Aghion, Bolton and Fries
4Non-performing assets may be liquidated and the bank will obtain j with probability  . Otherwise the assets will have
a continuation value with a realised return ⇡. Formally: AN =  j + (1   )⇡.
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(1999), we characterise the balance sheet of a banking system as:
✓ =  AN + (1   )AP   (L+ C). (1)
A solvent banking system is one where the payo↵s from performing and non-performing assets exceeds
the value of liabilities issued to fund the assets and reserve capital at each point in time. Banks are
solvent at all points in time when A   L+C. If  AN + (1   )AP < L+C then the banking system is
insolvent.
Banks’ asset portfolios are sensitive to macro-financial shocks. A shock can cause asset price declines
and disruptions to the supply of credit, generating non-performing loans (Nkusu, 2011). To capture
this we assume that the shock i changes the proportion of non-performing loans by µi, where µi   1.
Therefore, following a shock the expected proportion of NPLs is given by:
 i = µi . (2)
For the time being, we’ll assume that  i is from a uniform distribution between [0, 1] with mean  ¯i and
variance  2 i . ✓i represents the net worth of the banking system as a result of shock i:
✓i =  iAN + (1   i)AP   (L+ C). (3)
Information We assume that all information is common to the actors except the DM does not know
the proportion of non-performing assets ( i) following the shock, so she does not know the recovery (r)
value of assets in the crisis Ari =  iAN + (1    i)AP . This is primarily because of the opacity of loan
valuations during a crisis. She does however know the distribution of Ar.5
Containment Policy Choices Policies used to respond to financial crises can be categorised by
their use during two broad phases beginning with containment and followed by resolution (Honohan
and Laeven, 2005). Here we focus exclusively on crisis containment policymaking in the initial period
following the shock.
Useful extensions could examine how containment policy choices a↵ect the set and desirability of
subsequent resolution policies. It would be interesting to understand how the DM learns from initial
policy choice outcomes. Nonetheless, it is important to note that containment policy decisions are not
5Currently we do not assume that gathering information is costly to signallers. One extension would be to apply
Dewatripont and Tirole’s (1999) model for understanding how to incentivise agents to gather information when doing so
is costly. This could provide insights into how to structure financial regulatory institutional systems to gather information
and convey it to decision-makers such that they can make preferred decisions. Ultimately, this would build on the model
presented here, as once the information is gathered actors enter into a similar signalling game.
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trivial. They have potentially large and long lasting e↵ects. For example, once a government institutes a
guarantee it can be di cult to remove it without undermining market confidence. Thus it is important
to understand how they are made.
Governments have a range of containment policy choices to restore confidence in financial systems.
These include liability and asset guarantees (e.g. supporting the value of certain assets held by banks),
as well as liquidity assistance and recapitalisation which ensures their solvency. For simplicity, we assume
that the DM is indi↵erent between the di↵erent containment policy types.
We conceptualise containment policies G as being from a unidimensional space. We choose to further
conceptualise G as a proportion of the pre-shock book value of assets in the banking system A, and
denote this g, where g = GA . g is from the set {gi, . . . , gn}. Focusing on containment policies as a
proportion of assets is not necessary.6 However, it is substantively meaningful for actors who care about
containment costs. Assuming a best case scenario where containment costs can be recuperated up to
the recovery value of banking system assets,7 if support is equal to the recovery value of those assets the
support will be ‘costless’.8
In addition to providing support to the banking sector, politicians can require private sector par-
ticipation or impose costs on the private sector by, for example, requiring haircuts and bail-ins. These
policies e↵ectively reduce the public costs of containment, and the public support provided to the banking
sector. Therefore, we conceptualise g as net of publicly forced private sector participation and costs.
For a shock i we can express the assets’ recovery value Ari in terms of the assets’ pre-shock book
value A with ↵i, where ↵i =
Ari
A . A costless containment policy g for a shock i is be one where g ↵i = 0.
DM’s Preferences If the DM has ‘moderate’ preferences in that she wants to ensure that the guarantee
has no direct costs to the taxpayer she would choose guarantee gk that equals the recovery value of the
loans in the system ↵i. This choice may calm the liquidity crisis and maintain banking system solvency,
while ensuring that the state could recuperate the containment policy costs. It is not necessary to
assume that the DM prefers gk ↵i = 0. She may be more concerned about financial system stability or
protecting banks from losses and want some gk > ↵i. Or she may be worried about the potential losses
from the guarantees or the moral hazard containment policies could create and prefer some gk < ↵i.
At this point, we assume that the DM has moderate preferences. In order to be re-elected, incumbents
need to please taxpaying voters who have a preference for both financial stability (as instability is costly to
them) and do not want to provide costly bailouts (see Keefer, 2007; Rosas, 2009). Aiming for gk ↵i = 0
6For example, we could think of them as a proportion of the banking system’s total balance sheet value ✓ or indeed of
liabilities.
7They would e↵ectively be collateral either ex ante or ex post.
8This of course assumes there are no costs associated with acquiring, administering, and selling the assets as well as the
costs of extending the support. However, including these costs would not fundamentally change our model.
8
allows the DM to balance these two preferences. DM’s moderate containment policy preference can
be enforced at the ballot box by voters. Nonetheless, it is important to note that we do not make a
normative judgement when describing a preference for gk   ↵i = 0 as ‘moderate’. There may certainly
be legitimate reasons to provide guarantees above or below this depending on how the actors weigh the
relative importance of moral hazard, financial stability, and taxpayer costs. Of course, extensions of our
work could easily examine situations and reasons for why DM’s have other preferences.
Regardless, our information poor DM does not know the recovery value of banking system assets.
She cannot choose the containment level that most matches her preferences without more information.
Signaller Preferences To learn the recovery value of the banking system’s assets the DM must rely on
signals from the other players. The DM does not have the resources to undertake the highly complex task
of supervising banks herself. So she has delegated supervision to financial policy bureaucrats, e.g. central
banks and/or financial supervisors, who can specialise and develop specific policy expertise. Though
financial policy bureaucrats have their own containment policy preferences,9 the DM relies on their
information when a crisis strikes as she does not “magically find resources” (Epstein and O’Halloranx,
1999, 10) needed to make an independent assessment of the banking sector’s health. Furthermore, given
that most financial bureaucrats have lucrative careers awaiting them in the private sector even if removed
from o ce, it is di cult for the DM to create incentive-compatible contracts (Dijkstra, 2010) ensuring
that she receives accurate information.
It could be that the signallers’ preferences are perfectly aligned with the DM’s. Of course such a
close alignment of preferences may not always be the case. In crony capitalist and other models of crisis
containment policymaking, banking industry actors are often assumed to want high levels of support
to forestall insolvency (Rosas, 2006, 2009). Public sector signallers may have cronyistic ties with the
banking industry or be ‘captured’ by the industry. Capture may involve the regulator perceiving the
interests of the banks to be the same as that of the state (Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine, 2006). They may
therefore prefer policies that ensure the continuation of financial institutions rather than prioritising the
recovery value of bank assets to protect taxpayers (e.g. some gk > ↵i). Even in countries with seemingly
‘strong’ institutions, an independent central bank governor, for example, may have a preference for
financial stability over low costs to the state and as such prefer large containment policies (Honohan and
Laeven, 2005). On the other hand other bureaucrats involved in the game, in departments of finance for
9Rather than having preferences about policy outcomes, signallers might be primarily concerned with their professional
reputation as policy experts. See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) for a formal discussion of such situations. Though all
financial bureaucrats are likely concerned with their reputations to some extent, it is clear that many–including those
discussed in our case study below–have preferences about containment policy outcomes. For example, regulators may also
be motivated by career concerns from within the finance industry, rather than as regulators per se, ideological beliefs, or
conflicting statutory mandates. It could nonetheless be useful to extend the model to formally incorporate actors with
reputational incentives to provide information.
9
example, may be more concerned with fiscal costs and/or moral hazard problems. They would therefore
prefer that the state limit its containment policies (some gk < ai). Though many banks, especially
troubled banks, may want a high containment level, preferences in the banking system may actually be
heterogenous. Healthy banks, that believe they could weather a crisis, may prefer a lower containment
level. They could believe that accepting public assistance would undermine market confidence in them,
or that failures at weaker banks could be an opportunity to consolidate their presence in the market.
This is all to say that signaller’s containment policy preferences can be very heterogenous and certainly
need not be the same as the decision-maker’s.
In many countries central banks also gather supervisory information and have preferences about the
government’s crisis response. Central bankers, uniquely among financial bureaucrats, have the ability to
respond to crises using considerable resources based on their own balance sheet–e.g. emergency liquidity
assistance (ELA). This fact could influence their preferences as signallers. Though they can provide ELA,
central banks may be particularly concerned about risks to their balance sheets, risks that could hinder
their ability to achieve their other goals, primarily price stability. While they may want to assist financial
institutions, and have the ability to do so, central bankers may still prefer that fiscal policymakers act.
For example, during the height of the 2008 crisis the Bank of England requested that the Treasury
indemnify–guarantee–emergency liquidity assistance it provided, thus transferring crisis response risks
from the Bank to fiscal authorities.10 These preferences could influence what signals they make and their
inclusion in future work would be a direct extension of our model.
Sequence of Play The game has the following sequence of play:
• In t0 there is a shock to the banking system i that creates a new proportion of non-performing
assets. Hence ↵i is created.
• In t1 the sender observes ↵i and sends a message m↵ about the level of non-performing assets ↵i
to the DM. In games with more than one signaller, each sends their own message.
• In t2 the DM receives m↵, updates her prior knowledge about ↵ and decides gk, the containment
policy level.
• In t3 the outcome xk = gk   ↵i is realised.
10See Bank of England Committee of Court transcripts available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/
Documents/archivedocs/codm/20072009/transactionscomm.pdf. Accessed August 2015.
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4 The Game with Two Signallers
We develop the game with two signallers Please see the Annex for the single signaller version upon which
the two signaller version builds.
Utilities Following Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) the DM, FR, and MoF’s preferences can be charac-
terised as quadratic utility functions, whereby xMoF and xFR are the ideal outcomes for the MoF and FR
respectively and xDM is the optimal outcome for the DM. All players maximise their expected utilities
and their utility functions are given by:
UMoF =   (xMoF   x)2 UDM =   (xDM   x)2 UFR =   (xFR   x)2 . (4)
We assume that the MoF always has a preference for a lower containment level than the FR, except when
they have the same ideal points. This is merely for notational convenience. Similar to the single signaller
game, at t1 the signallers (MoF and FR) observe the shock, infer accurately ↵i, and send messages m1↵
and m2↵ from a set of feasible messages M = {mj1↵, . . . , mjn↵}. At t2 the DM observes m1↵ and m2↵
but not ↵i and updates her prior. She selects a guarantee gk. The outcome xk is realised at time t3:
xk = gk   ↵i.
Equilibrium The equilibrium concept here is Perfect Bayesian. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set
of strategies g⇤k(m1↵, m2↵), m
⇤
1↵(↵i, m2↵, gk), m
⇤
2↵(↵i, m1↵, gk), and posterior beliefs, h
⇤(↵i; m1↵, m2↵)
such that four conditions are met. The FR’s signalling strategy must maximise his expected utility given
the DM’s optimal choice of gk and the MoF’s optimal signalling strategy. The MoFs signalling strategy
must maximise his expected utility given the DM’s optimal choice of gk and the FR’s optimal signalling
strategy. The DM’s choice of gk must maximise her expected utility given her posterior belief about the
value of ↵. The DM’s posterior belief must be consistent with the optimal strategies of the senders as
per Bayes’ rule. Building on Satyanath (2006, 43), as well as Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gilligan
and Krehbiel (1987), there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following characteristics:
1. When ↵i takes values outside of the range ↵¯+2xMoF to ↵¯+2xFR, the two signallers send the true
value of ↵i to the DM. The DM then chooses gk = ↵i with the outcome xk = 0.
2. When ↵i takes values between ↵¯+2xMoF and ↵¯+2xFR, the two senders send conflicting messages
of the value of ↵i. The DM then chooses gk = ↵¯ with the outcome xk = ↵¯  ↵i .
See the Annex for the proof.
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5 Comparative Statics
We now illustrate the implications of the two signaller model’s equilibrium in comparative statics with
various levels of signaller polarisation. Comparative statics give us an idea of when accurate communi-
cation between the signallers and the DM breaks down, i.e. signals become uninformative. The further
away the signallers’ ideal points are from the DM’s, the more often the DM will make non-preferred
containment policy choices. Figure 1 shows the guarantee choices and outcomes made under the two
signaller game from four scenarios using 1,000 random draws of ↵ from a uniform continuous distribution
with the range [0.65, 0.95] and mean of 0.8.11 In other words the realisation value of the banking system
assets following a shock ranges between 65 and 95 percent of the book value of the pre-shock assets. This
is a more realistic range of values than [0, 1], though it represents a situation that is on average more
dire than the Irish case discussed below.
The first row of plots shows how relatively costly the containment policy is. In all of the scenarios
we assume that the DM is moderate and so most prefers g   ↵ = 0. The first scenario (shown in the
left-most column) is one where the signallers’ ideal points are somewhat close to the DM’s (the MoF’s is
-0.05 and the FR’s is 0.05). One third of the values of ↵ are outside of the range [↵¯+2xMoF , ↵¯+2xFR],
i.e. [0.7, 0.9]. When this is the case both signallers signal ↵i and the DM chooses gk = ↵i. This is
represented in the top-left most square by the 45 degree containment policy decision lines below 0.65 and
above 0.85. The DM’s payo↵ is 0 and the signaller’s payo↵s are both -0.0025. Only when 0.7 < ↵i < 0.9
do signallers send conflicting messages. In these cases the DM chooses gk = ↵¯ = 0.8. The DM’s payo↵
is less than 0 in all cases except when ↵i = 0.8, with decreasing utility the further away ↵i falls from ↵¯.
She chooses a lower containment policy than she ideally wants when ↵¯+ 2xMoF  ↵i < ↵¯. She chooses
a higher level than she would like when ↵¯ < ↵i  ↵¯+ 2xFR.
The right-most column of Figure 1 shows a situation where signallers have very polarised preferences
and as a result are completely uninformative. The MoF’s ideal point is -0.15, while the FR’s is 0.15. The
range [↵¯+2xMoF , ↵¯+2xFR] is greater than the range of ↵’s distribution. So the FR and MoF only send
conflicting signals and the DM always chooses a containment policy at ↵¯. This leads to only one situation
where the DM chooses her ideal policy, when ↵i = ↵¯. Clearly, having signallers with containment policy
preferences further away from the DM’s leads to less preferred policies for the DM.
The two centre columns show asymmetrical signaller preferences around the DM’s idea point. In the
second column is a situation where xMoF =  0.05 and xFR = 0.15. In this case the FR and MoF send
uninformative signals for all values of ↵ > 0.7. The reverse preference arrangement is shown in the third
column with the reverse results, i.e. informative signals are sent at all values of ↵ > 0.9.
11Figure 1 can be reproduced using the Python and R scripts available at [WITHHELD FOR BLIND REVIEW].
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Figure 1: Equilibrium from a Two Signaller Game with a moderate DM and various signaller ideal points.
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Reminder: in the three lower rows of plots, actors’ maximum utility is represented by 0.
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In this application we see how slight di↵erences in preferences can lead the DM to miscalculate their
desired containment level, and could lead either to a non-preferred socialisation of bank losses or low
containment level.
6 Case Study: Containment Policy Decisions in Ireland
To further demonstrate the usefulness of our model we apply it to understand the Irish Government’s 2008
crisis containment policymaking. We first make a prediction about the chosen containment level based on
our signalling game and the underlying health of the Irish banking system at the time. The prediction
indicates that the Irish Prime Minister (PM)–the decision-maker–would choose a higher containment
level than his ideal preference when preferences diverge.
The intuition behind this conclusion starts from the idea that signallers with conflicting preferences
send conflicting signals. As such the PM will not know who to believe. So, he makes a ‘best guess’ that the
crisis is average, there are relatively few NPLs, and so the real value of all bank assets is relatively high.
Thus he provides generous guarantees believing that few will be called, while reestablishing stability.
However, because there are many NPLs and so the assets’ recovery value is very low, many of the
guarantees are called upon at great public expense. Thus the PM chooses a much higher guarantee than
he wanted.
The Signallers We find evidence using primary and secondary documentation, that the signallers can
be placed into two groups. Civil service sta↵ at the Department of Finance (DoF) expressed concern
about the potential costs of public intervention given the size of the problem, and were reportedly against
a full guarantee. Conversely, the Financial Regulator did not appear concerned with potential problems
in the banks, instead preferred to restore financial stability, and so did not communicate that the recovery
value of bank assets was relatively low. Bank o cials also signalled that the recovery value would be
high as part of a push for a full guarantee. The two groups thus sent conflicting signals. We further
demonstrate the plausibility of our argument by comparing it to major alternatives from the political
economy literature, many of which assume perfect information in this type of case.
Predictions Let’s predict what containment policy level the Irish Prime Minister would choose as-
suming he relied on information from two signallers, one with a preference for a high level and one for
a low level. Let’s assume that the Prime Minister has a preference for a ‘costless’ containment in that
gk   ↵i = 0. We further assume that actors with a high containment preference, for example troubled
banks with high proportions of non-performing loans, would like gk   ↵i = 0.05. Because very troubled
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banks’ individual balance sheets have more non-performing loans that are likely to have a lower recovery
value than the banking system average, they needed the overall level of banking system support to be
larger in order to prevent insolvency. gk   ↵i = 0.05 is likely to be an underestimated preference for the
most troubled banks. For example, Anglo Irish Bank had an NPL ratio of just under 15 percent in 2010
rising to almost 35 in 2012 (Fitch Ratings, 2013). We assume that other actors have a preference for a
smaller containment policy such that gk   ↵i =  0.05. As we will see, these preferences are more than
far enough apart to lead to uninformative signals in the Irish case.
To understand this let’s look at the last assumption we need to make: the range of the uniform dis-
tribution of the recovery value of Irish banking system assets. To determine the range, let’s first consider
the likely non-performing loans range. In the seven years before the crisis Ireland had a mean NPL
ratio of 0.86 percent without much variation. We assume that this is the lowest end of the distribution.
It would be a situation where the crisis was entirely a short-term liquidity crisis, where the realisation
value of the banking system assets did not change. By 2012 the ratio increased to 18.7 percent (World
Bank, 2013). We assume that 19 is the maximum NPL ratio as it is larger than the NPL ratios in
almost every other Eurozone country in 2012 including Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Let’s assume that
the recovery value of non-performing assets is 50 percent.12 So the range of the distribution of recovery
values expressed as a proportion of the pre-crisis book value of assets is 0.905 to 0.9957 with a mean of
0.9537.
In a two signaller game where one signaller wanted a containment policy of only about gk ↵i = 0.025
or more and the other wanted about gk   ↵i =  0.025 or less all signals would be uninformative as the
signallers would send di↵erent values. The Prime Minister would then choose a policy of gk = 0.9537
regardless of the true recovery value of the assets (see the right-most column in Figure 1 for a similar
situation). Because the true recovery value in the Irish case happened to be at the minimum possible
value, the Prime Minister would end up choosing a containment level much higher than what he wanted.
How well does the model’s prediction fit the sequence of events in the 2008 Irish banking crisis
containment case?
The Events Multiple national and international shocks from 2007 through 2008 considerably under-
mined policymakers’ understanding of the Irish banking system’s health. Starting in March 2007 the
Irish house price index began to decline for the first time in five years. The emergence of the subprime
mortgage crises in the United States in mid-2007 resulted in a tightening of the market for short-term
12The overall discount that the Irish National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) applied when it acquired assets from
five banks, including the most troubled ones, was 58 percent from when it became operational, more than one year after
the containment policy choice, into January 2010 (Economic, Sta↵ of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
A↵airs, 2011, 14). We assume that the assets NAMA acquired were not the most troubled, so we further discount the
recovery percentage to 50 percent.
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wholesale funding in August 2007. Hedge funds in the the United States began to short Irish banks
in Summer 2007, and the collapse of Bear Stearns investment bank in March 2008 and then Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, created a global credit crunch with major ripple e↵ects for the Irish banking
system. Irish banks found it increasingly di cult to rollover the debt they used to make property-based
loans.
On September 20th the Irish Government began its response to the crisis by increasing the deposit
guarantee scheme limit. It was initially raised from e20,000 to e100,000.13 However these moves had
little e↵ect on slowing corporate deposit withdrawals.14 By the end of September, a number of key Irish
banks, such as Anglo Irish Bank, were finding it very di cult to roll over the wholesale funds they had
borrowed and did not have adequate collateral to refinance with the European Central Bank.
On 30th September 2008, the Government announced a guarantee of all deposits (retail, commercial,
institutional, and interbank), covered bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt (lower tier II)
at the six main Irish banks (Irish Department of Finance, 2008).15 This amounted to e365 billion or
2.5 times Gross National Product (Honohan, 2010, 19). The figure is fairly close to the total value
of banking system assets as, for example when measured against just domestic credit to the private
sector which was almost 2.4 times Irish GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2013).16 This does not include, for
instance, the banks’ significant operations in the United Kingdom and United States. In hindsight we
have seen that “although international pressures contributed to the timing, intensity and depth of the
Irish banking crisis, the essential characteristics of the problem were domestic and classic” (Honohan,
2010, 22). However, in Fall 2008 the real nature of the problem was less clear to policymakers and they
had to rely on other actors for information.
A full account of the events surrounding the decision to issue such a 2008 guarantee has not yet
emerged. We can however piece together the preferences and signals of the main actors from the inde-
pendent reports, transcripts of the committee hearings, released documents on the crisis, and telephone
recordings. The Irish PM from May 2008 was Brian Cowen. He became prime minister after serving
as the MoF from 2004 until 2008. In political debates many accusations of cronyism were levelled at
their political party, Fianna Fail, and the PM. Though it is impossible to fully rule out the possibility
that decision-makers were not crony capitalist, we found no substantive evidence that the PM or MoF
had a preference for insolvent institutions to continue operating. Rather it appears the government were
relying heavily on signals from DoF civil servants, the FR, and the banks themselves, to make a policy
13The previous guarantee only covered 90 percent of an account under e20,000. The later guarantee covered 100 percent
of the first e100,000.
14See data from the Central Bank of Ireland (2011).
15The guarantee covered Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life and Permanent, Educational Building Society,
Anglo Irish Bank, and Irish Nationwide Building Society.
16Indicator number: FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS.
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decision that would contain the crisis at a low cost to taxpaying voters, thus warranting the our approach
here.
The Department of Finance civil service sta↵ in general appear to have had a preference for a lower
containment level and sent a signal that the recovery value of assets may be relatively low. In 2008 they
gave a policy presentation stating that “open-ended/legally binding State guarantees which would expose
the Exchequer to the risk of very significant costs are not regarded as part of the toolkit for successful
crisis management and resolution” (House of the Oireachtas, 2008a, empahsis in the origninal). This
position was qualified in the full scoping paper that the presentation was based on. It defined what
were likely to be situations with a high “risk of very significant costs”. It noted that solvent, but
illiquid institutions should be treated di↵erently from illiquid and insolvent institutions. The former
would likely be given guarantees early to avoid failure and avoid contagion (House of the Oireachtas,
2008c).17 Insolvent institutions, assuming they were not systemically important, were not seen as eligible
for guarantees. Overall, this suggests that the DoF had a somewhat low containment level preference.
At a meeting with all of the major policymakers and information providers on the 25 September 2008,
just days before the decision to issue the guarantee, civil service o cials for the Department of Finance
expressed great concern with the potential cost of the guarantee. They noted that “Government would
need a good idea of the potential loss exposures within Anglo [Irish Bank] and INBS [Irish Nationwide
Building Society]–on some assumptions INBS could be e2 billion after capital and Anglo could be e8.5
billion” (House of the Oireachtas, 2008e). Capital in Anglo Irish Bank at the time was claimed to
be e7.1 billion (see House of the Oireachtas, 2008d) and they were therefore warning of potentially
large exposures to the State and large losses in the banks. Nyberg (2011, 81) indicates the DoF civil
servants may have had a preference for the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank with costs imposed on
creditors. While McWilliams notes that o cials in the Department of Finance “were dead set against a
full guarantee” (2009, 25).
Conversely the Financial Regulator appears to have had a preference for a higher containment level
and sent signals–conflicting with the DoF civil service sta↵’s–that the assets’ recovery value was in fact
high. Their information came primarily from unobtrusive evaluations of bank’s own positions. Private
bank o cials had a clear preference for a higher containment level. Honohan (2010, 124) notes that Bank
of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank pushed for an immediate general guarantee (including subordinated debt)
and the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank (and possibly INBS) at a meeting with the PM and MoF on
September 29. Anglo Irish Bank made a presentation to the Department of Finance on the 18 September
2008 forecasting pre-tax profits of e1.4 billion for 2008 and e1.1 billion for 2009.
17The document cites the Northern Rock experience, where a bank run was precipitated by the Bank of England giving
the bank liquidity assistance. This quickly undermined confidence in the bank. The run ended when the UK Government
guaranteed 100 percent of its deposits.
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It has been shown the Financial Regulator had very little independent knowledge of the underlying
exposures of the banks in Ireland. This is because the Financial Regulator had a deferential approach to
financial institutions, whereby there was an acceptance that the system was working (Honohan, 2010, 9).
This led them to have an unintrusive supervisory model which placed a large amount of trust in the banks
themselves and focused on processes and verification rather than attempting independent assessments
(Honohan, 2010, 8). Leaked internal recordings of telephone conversations between Anglo Irish Bank
employees made in September 2008 are particularly informative in this regard.18 In one conversation
between the head of retail banking Peter Fitzgerald and the head of the capital markets division John
Bowe discuss a meeting Bowe had with the Financial Regulator.19 In this conversation Bowe claims
that, when asked how much Anglo Irish Bank needed and if it would be enough, he told the o cials
that Anglo Irish Bank required e7 billion in funding. He tells Fitzgerald that this is in fact significantly
lower than the actual amount of financing that the bank needs and that he had pulled the e7 billion
estimate “out of [his] arse”.
At that same meeting on the 25 September 2008 where the DoF sta↵ warned of potential losses,
the Financial Regulator stressed that “there is no evidence to suggest that Anglo is insolvent . . . it is
simply unable to continue on the current basis from a liquidity point of view” (House of the Oireachtas,
2008e).20 A post-crisis commission investigating the banking crisis in Ireland states that discussions
surrounding the long-term risks of the guarantee were discarded and the FR “supported the assessments
of the major banks, the attention of the Ministers became concentrated on how to avoid the short term
risk of insu cient funding in the morning” (Nyberg, 2011, 79). This suggests the FR21 was a key actor
pushing for a broad guarantee partially by providing information that the banks’ assets’ recovery value
was high. Although some have noted that a consensus had emerged amongst all o cials that no Irish
bank should be allowed to fail (Honohan, 2010, 119), we have evidence of clear divergent preferences in
terms of the signals provided and the preferred level of containment support needed among the financial
bureaucrats and banks.
DoF civil service sta↵, the Financial Regulator, and bank o cials had divergent preferences and
sent conflicting signals to the Prime Minister. With conflicting information, the PM choose a higher
containment policy level than he wanted. Our model also aligns with the findings of the Report of
the Commission of Investigation into the banking sector in Ireland which concludes “the discussions
18The recordings are available from the Irish Independent (http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/
inside-anglo-the-secret-recordings-29366837.html), accessed Summer 2013.
19The head of the central bank was also present.
20This position was rea rmed by Merrill Lynch, who were hired to provide options to decision-makers at the time. On
29 September–the day before the full guarantees were made, a report issued by them stressed that
“at present, liquidity concerns aside; all of the Irish banks are profitable and well capitalised. However,
liquidity for some could run out in days rather than weeks.” (House of the Oireachtas, 2008b, 2)
21The o cials at the Central Bank of Ireland largely concurred with the FR’s view (Nyberg, 2011, 79).
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for alternative measures before and on September 29, 2008, were conducted on the basis of very defi-
cient information . . . If more relevant information on and analysis of the underlying position of some of
the banks had been available, discussions and policy recommendations may have been very di↵erent”
(Nyberg, 2011, 93).
The Government went on to su↵er considerable losses in the next election, very much due to strong
public opposition to the bank bailouts. PM Cowen resigned as leader of his Fianna Fa´il party before the
2011 election. The party’s vote share fell by about 24 percentage points and the party was not returned
to government.22 Information asymmetries led the PM to choose a policy that he and the voters did not
want, for which the PM and his party paid considerably at the ballot box.
The Alternatives How well does the Irish narrative fit the signalling argument relative to alternative
explanations? Were Irish decision-makers simply crony capitalists? The documents we have found do
not indicate that the PM had high guarantee preferences or that he wanted insolvent institutions to
continue operating as would be the case if he was a crony capitalists. A key feature in the Irish financial
system was a lack of bureaucratic capacity. The Financial Regulator, the actor primarily tasked with
gathering financial sector information, appears to have had very little capacity to actually gather its own
information, relying instead on the banks’ assessments. It also had very similar preferences to the banks
regarding the guarantee and did not appear gather information that would contradict the the bank’s
policy conclusions. As such bureaucratic incapacity could be endogenous to the signalling game.
It does not appear that the number of veto players influenced policy choices. The governing par-
liamentary coalition supported the decision to issue the guarantee. Even among the opposition there
seems to have been a general consensus that, as a senior opposition politician commented: “when the
government comes to you with emergency legislation, you have a duty to support them”.23 In a sense
this situation is similar to Rodrik’s (1999) view that if veto players are arranged to manage conflict then
responses will be quick. Though, it is may be better to describe it as a situation where coalition veto
players gave up their power in order to hasten decision-making which was the outcome of a signalling
game. Ireland had competitive elections but the outcomes were nonetheless very costly to the public.
This is the opposite of Keefer’s (2007) prediction.
We did not find evidence that international actors like the International Monetary Fund or another
external actor with low guarantee preferences was a relevant information provider or directly involved
in the decision-making process. The European Central Bank had provided substantial liquidity to the
Irish banking system leading up to the guarantee decision (Honohan, 2010, 117), but do not appear to
22See the European Election Database: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/. Accessed January
2015.
23From interview with senior government politician.
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have supported the decision to issue the guarantee (see for example European Central Bank, 2008a,b).
Was the government unable to bargain with the banking sector to secure private sector contributions
to crisis containment because of the sector’s collective action problems in line with Woll’s (2014) argu-
ment?Rather than being unable to secure private sector contributions, the government was in fact able
to get commitments from Allied Irish and Bank of Ireland to provide a e5 billion short-term liquidity
facility to aid Anglo Irish around the time of the guarantee.
7 Conclusion
The model and findings in this article have important implications for crisis containment policymaking,
as well as financial supervision even in countries with sophisticated financial markets. Our model and
evidence indicate that when responding to banking crises policymakers greatly benefit from having as
close to full information as possible about their countries’ banking system. Good information may be
purposefully hard to come by during crises, even in advanced democratic economies. When strategically
minded signallers preferences diverge from decision-makers’ they can have incentives to give inaccurate
information.
Much of the recent research on the optimal design of financial supervisors and economic policymaking
generally has been aimed at tying the hands of strategic elected policymakers. The typical solution, as
with central banking, has been to grant regulators’ de facto operational independence from elected
policymakers (Gandrud, 2013; Walter, 2008, Ch. 1). Independence may help shield regulators from the
most blatant crony capitalistic pressure that banks can exert on politicians or electoral time-inconsistency
problems that elected o cials may have. However, our findings suggests another problem should also be
considered. Even if elected policymakers have preferences for minimising public crisis management costs,
they can be led astray by their bureaucrats, independent or not. Independence does not ensure that
they will provide unbiased information to policymakers, because it does not ensure that these strategic
actors will have preferences that lead them to do so. Hayo and Hefeker argue that nothing about actors
being independent rules out them “pursuing a political agenda” of any sort (2002, 123). As strategic
actors they use the tools available to them to pursue these preferences.
Future work should address how institutional design improvements could be made to change financial
bureaucrats’ preferences so that they are more inclined to provide accurate information. Some research
has been done on this topic, including Persson and Taballini’s (1993) work on targets and Dewatripont
and Tirole’s (1999) work on incentivising signallers. Satyanath (2006) argues that politicians should
have more discretion to appoint information providing bureaucrats or that increasing bureaucratic in-
dependence will lead to more accurate information. Another related possibility would be to delegate
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more responsibility for supervision and crisis containment to independent central banks who can appoint
their own sta↵. Hopefully studies in this area will treat decision-makers, financial bureaucrats, and other
information providers as strategic actors, potentially with divergent preferences.
References
Abonyi, George. 2005. “Policy Reform in Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank’s Financial Sector
Governance Reforms Program Loan.” Asian Development Bank ERD Working Paper (76). 2
Aghion, Philippe, Patrick Bolton and Steven Fries. 1999. “Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case
of Transition Economies.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 155:51–70. 3
Alesina, Alberto and Allan Drazen. 1991. “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?” The American Economic
Review 81(5):1170–1188. 1, 2
Bank of England. 2007. “Emergency Meeting of Court, 13 September 2007.”. http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Pages/digitalcontent/archivedocs/codm/20072009.aspx. 1
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Eric Levine. 2006. Rethinking Banking Regulation. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 3
Central Bank of Ireland. 2011. “Business Credit Deposits.”. Date Accessed: 22/10/2011.
URL: http: // www. centralbank. ie/ polstats/ stats/ cmab/ Pages/ BusinessCredit. aspx 14
Crawford, Vincent P and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica
50(6):1431–1451. 1, 3, 4, 7, 7, 7
Dewatripont, Mathias and Jean Tirole. 1999. “Advocates.” The Journal of Political Economy 107(1):1–
39. 5, 7
Dijkstra, Robert J. 2010. “Accountability of financial supervisory agencies: An incentive approach.”
Journal of Banking Regulation 11(2):115–128. 3
Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke. 1994. “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The
Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War.” American Journal of Political Science 38(2):362–380. 2
Economic, Sta↵ of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial A↵airs. 2011. “The Economic
Adjustment Programme for Ireland.” European Economy Occasional Papers 76:1–90. 12
Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Halloranx. 1999. Delegating powers: A transaction cost politics approach
to policy making under separate powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3
21
European Central Bank. 2008a. “Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 October 2008 at the request
of the Irish Minister for Finance on a draft Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008.”.
URL: https: // www. ecb. int/ ecb/ legal/ pdf/ en_ con_ 2008_ 44. pdf 6
European Central Bank. 2008b. “Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank on government guarantees for bank debt.”.
URL: http: // www. ecb. int/ pub/ pdf/ other/ recommendations_ on_ guaranteesen. pdf 6
Fitch Ratings. 2013. “Fitch Ratings’ Report: Peer Review: Irish Banks.”. http://www.fitchratings.
com/creditdesk/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=708766. 6
Gandrud, Christopher. 2013. “The di↵usion of financial supervisory governance ideas.” Review of Inter-
national Political Economy 20(4):881–916. 7
Gandrud, Christopher and Mark Hallerberg. 2015a. “Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic
Deficit? The need for greater supervisory data transparency.” Journal of Common Market Studies
53(4):769–785. 1
Gandrud, Christopher and Mark Hallerberg. 2015b. “When all is said and done: updating ”Elections,
special interests, and financial crisis”.” Research and Politics 2(3):1–9. 1, 2
Gibbons, Robert. 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 7
Gilligan, Thomas and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “Collective Decision Making and Standing Committees:
An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organizations 3:287–335. 1, 3, 4, 4
Grossman, Emiliano and Cornelia Woll. 2014. “Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts.”
Comparative Political Studies 47(4):574–600. 1
Hayo, Bernd and Carsten Hefeker. 2002. “Reconsidering Central Bank Independence.” European Journal
of Political Economy 18:653–674. 7
Honohan, Patrick. 2010. “The Irish Banking Crisis Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-
2008.”. A Report to the Minister for Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank.
URL: http: // www. bankinginquiry. gov. ie/ The% 20Irish% 20Banking% 20Crisis%
20Regulatory% 20and% 20Financial% 20Stability% 20Policy% 202003-2008. pdf 1, 6, 6
Honohan, Patrick and Luc Laeven, eds. 2005. Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and Resolution.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3, 3
22
House of the Oireachtas. 2008a. “Department’s Powerpoint presentation re Overview of Financial
Stability Resolution issues.”. Date Accessed: 3/1/2011.
URL: http: // www. oireachtas. ie/ documents/ committees30thdail/ pac/ reports/
documentsregruarantee/ document36. pdf 6
House of the Oireachtas. 2008b. “E-mail from Merrill Lynch to Department with attached Memorandum
examining various options.”. Date Accessed: 19/10/2011.
URL: http: // www. oireachtas. ie/ viewdoc. asp? fn= /documents/ Committees30thDail/ PAC/
Reports/ DocumentsReGruarantee/ document3. pdf 20
House of the Oireachtas. 2008c. “Financial Issues–Scoping paper 24/01/2008.”. Date Accessed:
18/10/2011.
URL: http: // www. oireachtas. ie/ documents/ committees30thdail/ pac/ reports/
documentsregruarantee/ document37. pdf 6
House of the Oireachtas. 2008d. “Presentation from Anglo Irish Bank.”. Date Accessed: 19/10/2011.
URL: http: // www. oireachtas. ie/ viewdoc. asp? fn= /documents/ Committees30thDail/ PAC/
Reports/ DocumentsReGruarantee/ document15. pdf 6
House of the Oireachtas. 2008e. “Transcript of handwritten note of meeting with Financial Regula-
tor, Merrill Lynch, Central Bank, PwC, Arthur Cox, Attorney General, Taoiseach, Department of
Taoiseach, Minister for Finance, Department of Finance, NTMA, Goldman Sachs (for part) Thurs-
day.”. Date Accessed: 19/10/2011.
URL: http: // www. oireachtas. ie/ viewdoc. asp? fn= /documents/ Committees30thDail/ PAC/
Reports/ DocumentsReGruarantee/ document6. pdf 6
Huber, John D and Nolan McCarty. 2004. “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform.”
American Political Science Review 98(3):481–494. 2
Irish Department of Finance. 2008. “Government Decision to Safeguard Banking System.”. Date Ac-
cessed: 18/10/2011.
URL: http: // www. finance. gov. ie/ viewdoc. asp? DocID= 5475£& £CatID= 1£& £StartDate= 01+
January+ 2008 6
Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis.” International Organization
61(3):607–641. 1, 2, 3, 6
McWilliams, David. 2009. Follow the Money: The Tale of the Merchant of Ennis. Dublin: Gill &
MacMillan, Limited. 6
23
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1990. “Asymmetric information and financial crises: a historical perspective.”
National Bureau of Economic Research . 1
Nkusu, Mwanza. 2011. “Nonperforming Loans and Macrofinancial Vulnerabilities in Advanced
Economies.” IMF Working Papers . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1888904. 3
Nyberg, P. 2011. Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland, Report on the
Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland. Technical report. 6, 21
Ottaviani, Marco and Peter Norman Sørensen. 2006. “Professional advice.” Journal of Economic Theory
126(1):120–142. 9
Pepinsky, Thomas. 2014. Financial Crises and the Politics of Adjustment and Reform. In Research
Handbook on International Monetary Relations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 1
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 1993. “Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability.” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39:53–84. 7
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth
Collapses.” Journal of Economic Growth 4:385–412. 1, 2, 6
Rosas, Guillermo. 2006. “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises.”
American Journal of Political Science 50(1):175–191. 1, 2, 3
Rosas, Guillermo. 2009. Curbing Bailouts: Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative
Perspective. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1, 2, 3, 3
Satyanath, Shanker. 2006. Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil: Asia’s Banking Crisis. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 1, 2, 4, 7, 7
Sikka, Prem. 2009. “Financial Crisis and the Silence of the Auditors.” Accounting, Organizations and
Society 34(6-7):868–873. 1
Sobel, Joel. 2013. Giving and Receiving Advice. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics, ed. Daron
Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano and Eddie Dekel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1, 3
Sundararajan, Vasudevan and Toma´s Balin˜o. 1991. Banking Crises: Cases and Issues. Technical report
International Monetary Fund Washington, DC: . 2
Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. “Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements? Statis-
tically Selected Cases.” International Political Science Review 24(3):321–343. 2
24
Walter, Andrew. 2008. Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press. 7
Weber, Beat and Stefan W Schmitz. 2011. “Varieties of helping capitalism: politico-economic determi-
nants of bank rescue packages in the EU during the recent crisis.” Socio-Economic Review 9(4):639–669.
1
Woll, Cornelia. 2014. The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press. 1, 2, 6
World Bank. 2013. “World Development Indicators.”. http://data.worldbank.org/. 6, 6
25
Online Annex 1: The Single Signaller Game
Utilities Because the DM requires information from the FR to make her preferred containment policy
choice the DM’s payo↵ depends on the message mi sent by the FR and an unknown state of the world.
The DM’s payo↵ can be thus characterised by:
UDM (g,↵) =   (g   ↵)2 . (5)
The payo↵ of the FR is
UFR (g, ↵, b) =   (g   (↵  b))2 (6)
where b   0. The b parameter captures the distance between the DM’s and the FR’s ideal containment
policy points, denoted xDM and xFR. As we will see this distance influences the bias in the information
the FR gives to the DM. If b = 0 then their preferences are perfectly aligned and, as has been well
established in the signalling literature (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), the FR’s message will be completely
accurate.
Equilibrium Suppose the FR can choose to send two messages mL↵ and mH↵ where mL↵ < mH↵.
The signal is costless. Let g (m) denote the action taken by the DM in response to the message sent by
the FR. If ↵ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with mean ↵¯, in equilibrium the FR will use a threshold
strategy, whereby the FR will choose mL↵ when ↵ 2 [0, ↵⇤) and mH↵ when ↵ 2 (↵⇤, 1). ↵⇤ represents
the threshold value of ↵ at which the FR is indi↵erent between mL↵ and mH↵. So, the payo↵s for the
FR are characterised as:
mL↵ : (g(mL↵)  (↵  b))2
mH↵ : (g(mH↵)  (↵  b))2
. (7)
The benefit for the FR of sending message mH↵ over mL↵ is increasing in ↵ and can be characterised
as:
 g =  (g(mL↵)  (↵  b))2 + (g(mH↵)  (↵  b))2. (8)
After receiving the message from the types in [0,↵⇤) the DM will believe that the FR’s type, message,
is uniformly distributed on ↵ 2 [0, ↵⇤), and type (↵, 1) is uniformly distributed on ↵ 2 (↵⇤, 1). Therefore
the DM’s equilibrium strategy will be:
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g(mL↵) =
↵⇤
2
and g(mH↵) =
↵⇤ + 1
2
. (9)
For all types in [0, ↵⇤) for the FR to prefer sending mL↵ to mH↵, it must be that all types in [0, ↵⇤)
prefer g(mL↵) =
↵⇤
2 over g(mH↵) =
↵⇤+1
2 , also all types in (↵
⇤, 1) must prefer g(mH↵) = ↵
⇤+1
2 over
g(mL↵) =
↵⇤
2 . Given that ↵
⇤ characterises the type that is indi↵erent we solve for the partially pooling
equilibrium by using the fact that when the utilities of the FR and DM are equal as:
↵⇤ + b  ↵
⇤
2
=
↵⇤ + 1
2
  (↵⇤ + b). (10)
simplifying to the formula ↵⇤ = 12   2b. Given ↵ = [0, 1], ↵⇤ must be positive. A two-step equilibrium
only exists if |b| < 14 . Thus when the value of |b|   14 , the FR does not distinguish between high and low
recovery values and the signal becomes completely uninformative and a completely pooling equilibrium
called a “babbling equilibrium” exists where the FR does not even make a crude distinction between
types, whereby he chooses randomly over one interval [0, 1] and uses each message m 2M regardless of
↵i and no information is transmitted. Therefore if the FR always reports the same message the DM’s
optimal strategy is to simply ignore the message and assign a uniform belief to all values ↵ 2 [0, 1]. Her
optimal strategy when she is unable to update her prior is to set g = ↵¯, i.e. 0.5. Therefore, central to
the argument presented here is the distance between the preferences of the financial regulator and the
decision-maker.
It may be more realistic to consider the equilibrium in the one signaller game when the FR makes
very fine distinctions between di↵erent levels of ↵. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that in the n-step
equilibrium, the number of intervals is a function of the preference parameter and largest integer given
by the quadratic formula:
1
2
"
1 +
s
1 +
✓
2
|b|
◆#
. (11)
Therefore as b approaches zero, more communication occurs and only if preferences are perfectly aligned
and an infinite number of intervals exist, does full communication occur (Gibbons, 1992). However, when
|b| > 0, signals become vague and uninformative. When |b| > 14 , the FR randomises over the interval
and the DM simply ignores the messages. Therefore, as Crawford and Sobel (1982) show, all equilibria
are partition equilibria where the FR can introduce noise in his signal by not distinguishing as finely
between information states. The FR does this to a larger degree the further their preferences are from
the DM.
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Online Annex 2: Equilibrium with Two Signallers
Building on Satyanath (2006, 139-140) a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for two signallers is a set of
strategies g⇤k(m1↵, m2↵), m
⇤
1↵(↵i, m2↵, gk), m
⇤
2↵(↵i, m1↵, gk), and posterior beliefs, h
⇤(↵i; m1↵, m2↵)
such that;
1. m1↵(↵i,m2↵, gk) 2 arg max EUs1, given g⇤k(m1↵,m2↵) and m⇤2↵(↵i,m1↵, gg)
2. m2(↵i,m1↵, gk) 2 arg max EUs2, given g⇤k(m1↵,m2↵) and m⇤1↵(↵i,m2↵, gg)
3. g⇤k(m1↵,m2↵) 2 arg max EU
´ 0.95
0.65 uc (gk,↵i)h ⇤ (↵i,m1↵,m2↵)d↵i
4. h⇤(↵i;m1↵,m2↵) = Pr(↵ = ↵i | m⇤1↵,m⇤2↵), as per Bayes’ rule.
Assuming that ↵ is uniformly distributed in [0.65, 0.95], though another range could be used.
Proposition: There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which;
1. m⇤1↵(↵i, m2↵, gk) = ↵i if ↵i = ↵¯+2xs1 or ↵i = ↵¯+2xs2, and s1 randomises with equal probability
over [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2] otherwise.
2. m⇤2↵(↵i, m1↵, gk) = ↵i if ↵i = ↵¯ 2xs1 or ↵i = ↵¯+2xs2, and s2 randomises with equal probability
over [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2] otherwise.
3. g⇤k(m1↵, m2↵) = ↵i if m1↵ = m2↵, and ↵¯ otherwise.
4. If m1↵ = m2↵, h⇤(↵i; m1↵, m2↵) = 1. If m1↵ 6= m2↵, h⇤(↵;m1↵,m2↵) = 0 for all ↵i /2
[↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2]
Note that we used a more general notation (s1 and s2) than above to denote the two signallers, where
s1 prefers an outcome xs1 < 0 and s2 prefers an outcomes xs2 < 0.
Proof: There are four parts to the proof.
1. To show that s1 maximises her expected utility given the DM’s policy choice and s2’s optimal
signalling strategy, as in part 1 above, we discuss each component of m⇤1↵(↵i, m2↵, gk):
(a) m⇤1↵(↵i, m2↵, gk) = ↵i if ↵i < ↵¯+ 2xs1:
i. When ↵i < ↵ + 2xs1 the DM will choose ↵¯ and xk > 2xs1 if m1↵ 6= m2↵, as in the
proposed equilibrium g⇤k(m1↵, m2↵) = ↵¯
ii. When m1↵ = m2↵ = ↵i, g⇤k(m1↵, m2↵) = ↵i, and xk = 0 which results in s1 having a
greater utility than x > 2xs1.
(b) m⇤1↵(↵i, m2↵, gk) = ↵i if ↵i > ↵¯ + 2xs1: If m1↵ 6= m2↵ the the DM chooses ↵¯. This is less
utility for s1 than x = 0 because x < 2xs2.
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(c) s1 randomises with equal probability over [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2] when ↵i 2 [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2]:
If ↵i 2 [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2] signaller s2 will randomise between these two values and so s1
will not be able to match his signal. Her signal will thus have no e↵ect on the DM’s decision
as she will think that ↵i 2 [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2] regardless.
2. To show that s2 maximises his utility given the DM’s policy choice and s1’s optimal signalling
strategy, as in part 1 above, simply use the same logic as in the previous section, reversing the
signaller notation.
3. To show that the DM maximises her utility given her posterior belief about the value of ↵:
(a) If h⇤(↵i; m1↵, m2↵) = 1, which happens when m1↵ = m2↵, she can simply choose her optimal
strategy gk = ↵i if her ideal point is x = 0.
(b) If, however, h⇤(↵i; m1↵, m2↵) = 0 for all ↵i /2 [↵¯+ 2xs1, ↵¯+ 2xs2], which happens when
m1↵ 6= m2↵, she chooses gk to maximise:
ˆ ↵¯+2xs2
↵¯+2xs1
 (gk   ↵i)2h⇤(↵i, m1↵, m2↵)d↵i
which produces gk(m1↵, m2↵) = ↵¯ .
4. The consistency of h⇤(↵i; m1↵, m2↵) was established in 1(c) of the proof.
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